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Abstract 
The emerging wave of mega-FTAs during the global economic crisis era has so far attracted 
considerable academic attention. This paper primarily investigates two of the mega-FTAs, 
namely TPP and RCEP, from the perspective of Japan. It focuses on Japan’s role and interests 
in the launch of mega-FTAs and how Japan tries to keep them on track, with protectionism on 
the rise worldwide (particularly on the US side). 
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Introduction 
The aim of this study is to investigate two mega-FTAs, namely TPP and RCEP, from the 
point of view of Japan, which has played a crucial role in launching the newly emerged wave 
of mega-FTAs. Japan’s accession to TPP negotiations and its participation in other mega-
FTAs marked a bold change in its trade policy. Japan is aiming to boost its economic growth 
through external relations.  
Since US withdrawal from TPP in early 2017, Japan has undertaken a leading role in 
keeping TPP and other mega-FTAs on track and contributed much to their launch. The 
development of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific (including FTAs) has been mainly formed by 
the interplay among China, Japan and the United States, the results of which can also be 
recognised throughout the whole study, which is structured as follows: the first section gives a 
short overview on the emergence of mega-FTAs and the main motivations behind their 
launch; the second section compares TPP and RCEP by considering their antecedents, 
progress, aims and content and the current stage of their development; the third section 
focuses on the main shifting points of Japan’s trade policy from multilateralism 
(GATT/WTO) to bilateralism (bilateral FTAs) and finally to mega-FTAs; the fourth section 
reveals the main economic (political) interests of Japan in participating in mega-FTAs and 
keeping them on track during the global rise of protectionism; and the final section closes the 
study with some conclusions. 
 
Mega-FTAs in the world economy 
Since 1990 (and especially since 2000), parallel to the deceleration of multilateral trade 
liberalisation in the framework of GATT/WTO negotiation rounds, the number of regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) has seen rapid growth. The cumulative number of RTAs reported to 
the GATT/WTO increased from 86 in 1990 to 266 in 2000, then to 659 in 2017.
1
 And this 
emerging wave of RTAs has recently culminated in the appearance of mega-FTAs such as the 
Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the EU–Japan EPA and the 
China–Japan–Korea (CJK) FTA. The EU and NAFTA can be considered as original mega-
regional agreements covering two of the three biggest regional economic blocks (or regional 
concentrations of global value chains/global production networks) of the world economy 
which have become interconnected through the TTIP in the recent wave of mega-FTAs. In 
terms of state-led integration, East Asia had lagged behind Europe and North America; the 
negotiations on the region-wide FTA in East Asia, namely RCEP, started only in 2013. In the 
new wave of mega-FTAs, East Asia has also become interconnected with the EU and the 
NAFTA through the EU–Japan EPA and TPP, respectively.  
Mega-FTAs are deep integration partnerships in the form of FTAs between countries or 
regions with a major share of world trade and FDI, and in which two or more of the parties 
serve as hubs in global value chains/global production networks (i.e. the US, the EU 
(Germany), Japan, China). Because of these characteristics, Richard Baldwin
2
 predicted that 
mega-regionals would establish global trade governance over the most dynamic segment of 
the world trade, i.e. the supply chain trade which the WTO rules in their current form could 
not regulate and support adequately. Mega-FTAs can also stop the rapid proliferation of 
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FTAs, consolidating them and resolving their negative ‘noodle bowl effects’. Their coverage 
of different issues far beyond the removal of tariffs will facilitate the more efficient 
functioning of supply chains. In addition to this, we can identify several other economic 
motivations behind the creation of mega-FTAs: improved and/or preferential access to new 
markets; upgrading or refreshing old agreements; achieving higher ambition agreements; 
economic stimulus in an era of tight budgets (after the global economic and financial crisis), 
etc.
3
 According to Schwab and Bhatia,
4
 the decision to launch a mega-regional agreement is 
often informed by geopolitical considerations. However, the ultimate success of the 
negotiation and the long-term viability of the arrangement are based more on economic and 
commercial considerations (see the aforementioned motivations). In this study, we will also 
focus primarily on the economic motivations of Japan regarding the two mega-FTAs (RCEP, 
TPP) in the Asia-Pacific. Japan has had a strong influence on the launch of the present era of 
mega-FTAs. Akira Amari, Japan’s former state minister in charge of TPP, strongly believes 
that Japan’s participation in TPP has triggered the era of mega-FTAs, because there are 
interests in Japan that are sensitive about agricultural products, among others. The country 
was an entire one or two rounds behind its peers in terms of bilateral FTAs
5
 when it declared 
that it would participate in TPP and, furthermore, take a leading role in making rules with a 
consequent large impact globally, bringing about full-scale launches of geographically broad 
economic partnerships and mega-FTAs – including the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) between the USA and the EU, the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) in East Asia and the Japan–EU Economic Partnership Agreement.6  
 
Comparison of RCEP and TPP 
RCEP and TPP, mega-FTAs which overlap each other, represent a significant share of global 
GDP, trade and population. Three of the world’s four largest economies (China, India and 
Japan) are member countries in RCEP and two of them are the world’s first (China) and 
second (India) most populous countries. In 2015, RCEP member countries’ share in global 
GDP (PPP), world population and global trade was 37.4 per cent, 47.8 per cent and 29 per 
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cent respectively. TPP partner countries represent a lower share in global GDP, trade and 
population than do RCEP member countries,
7
 but TPP covers the trading block of NAFTA 
(plus Japan), so the difference between their economic weight (measured in percentage 
points) is not so large, especially in terms of trade (3.1 per cent). RCEP is under negotiation 
by ten ASEAN countries and Japan, China, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. 
The original 12 signatories of TPP are the United States, Canada, Mexico, Japan, Vietnam, 
Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Peru, Chile, Australia and New Zealand. In terms of income 
level, the member countries of RCEP are more diverse than those of TPP. RCEP countries 
range from advanced to least developed. In the case of TPP, developed countries outnumber 
developing countries, while for RCEP the reverse is true. This difference between RCEP and 
TPP is reflected in their aims, commitments and method of negotiation (see below). However, 
before going into more detail, a short overview on the origin and antecedents of RCEP and 
TPP is given. 
The East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
for East Asia (CEPEA) can be considered the predecessors of RCEP. After the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997–98, East Asian countries turned from APEC to ASEAN+38 cooperation and 
focused on the building of the vaguely defined East Asian Community. The initial special 
feature of East Asian regionalism was that relations among ASEAN and Northeast Asian 
countries evolved in a bilateral rather than regional form. However, the creation of a region-
wide FTA was studied by East Asian countries and had been on the agenda from the first 
(2001), initially only in the form of the East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) with ASEAN+3 
countries, and later in the form of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia 
(CEPEA), which included ASEAN+6
9
 countries as well. EAFTA was supported by China. 
CEPEA was proposed in 2006 and supported by Japan, whose aim was to counterbalance 
China`s growing regional influence by inviting Australia, New Zealand and India to join the 
East Asian cooperation (East Asia Summit, CEPEA).
10
 After several years of study on 
EAFTA and CEPEA, in 2011 ASEAN countries recommended the creation of RCEP 
(ASEAN+6), the idea of which came from ASEAN retaining its central role in East Asian 
regionalism at a time when the trilateral cooperation among Japan, China and South Korea 
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9
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 Australia is always considered to be a reliable partner for Japan in regionalism (see APEC and its 
predecessors). India was taken into account as a promising investment destination for Japanese companies where 
they could extend their regional production networks. Both countries were also targeted by Japan to strengthen 
its security relations with countries other than the USA.  
was growing stronger during the global economic crisis. China decided to support the creation 
of an ASEAN+6 FTA in the form of RCEP. The change in China`s approach to a region-wide 
FTA in East Asia was largely influenced by the new Asia-Pacific strategy of the USA, which 
included the creation of TPP, an Asia-Pacific FTA. In relation to this, Japan`s intention to 
participate in TPP negotiations, which was announced by Japanese PM Naoto Kan in October 
2010, was also an important influencing factor. Japan joined TPP negotiations in July 2013, 
with the negotiations on RCEP starting in May 2013.  
The starting point of TPP was the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPSEP), 
which was concluded by New Zealand, Chile, Singapore and Brunei in 2005. The USA joined 
the TPSEP negotiations on investment and financial services in 2008. In the end the USA did 
not join the TPSEP agreement but opened negotiations on a new agreement (TPP) with 
TPSEP member countries and other countries (Peru, Vietnam, Australia) in March 2010. 
Later, four additional countries (Malaysia, Mexico, Canada and Japan) joined the TPP 
negotiations. The timing of the launch of TPP was strongly influenced by the development of 
East Asian regionalism. First, the improving political relations between Japan and China and 
between Japan and South Korea led to the initiation of the Trilateral Summits in 2008. The 
strengthening trilateral relations among the three biggest economies in East Asia predicted the 
possibility for launching negotiations on the missing trilateral FTA and a region-wide FTA in 
East Asia. Second, in 2009 China became the leading export market for Japan, overtaking the 
USA,
11
 and the Japanese PM, Yukio Hatoyama, advocated the formation of an East Asian 
Community envisaging deeper regional economic cooperation at a time when the global 
financial/economic crisis reinforced doubts about the continuing economic predominance of 
the United States.
12
  
The USA called on Japan to join the TPP negotiations in September 2009 but, fearing a 
backlash from agricultural organisations, Japanese PM Hatoyama avoided giving a 
straightforward response to the suggestion.
13
 Japan joined the TPP negotiations only in July 
2013. The delay in Japanese participation was partly because of the protracted internal debate 
in Japan, but Japan`s accession was also prolonged partly because the country was powerful 
enough to affect the course of TPP negotiation as a whole.
14
 The fundamental aim of the USA 
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in inviting Japan was to significantly expand the scale of TPP from the Asian side. And with 
the launch of TPP the USA wanted to set the trading rules for the Asia-Pacific, and avoid 
being excluded from those preferences which East Asian countries would give each other by 
concluding an FTA, with the US ending up in a disadvantageous position in the fastest 
growing region (with an increasing number of middle-class consumers). Although TPP was 
not initiated within the framework of APEC, it had the potential to become a tool to achieve 
that legally binding trade agreement which was the aim of the USA in the 1990s, when APEC 
started to evolve, or later with the proposal of the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
(FTAAP) at the Hanoi APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in 2006. 
The aim, content and method of negotiations of RCEP and TPP, as previously mentioned, 
are significantly determined by participant countries’ development (income) level and also by 
who is initiating mega-FTAs (ASEAN or the USA). According to the initial aims, in terms of 
depth of liberalisation and scope of commitments, RCEP will not be as ambitious as TPP. It 
mainly concentrates on the liberalisation of trade in goods and has a WTO-consistent 
approach that strengthens compliance only on the existing global trading rules.
15
 RCEP 
consists of 18 chapters which, beyond trade in goods, cover trade in services, investment, e-
commerce, IPR, competition policy, ECOTECH (economic and technical co-operation), 
ROOs (rules of origin), CPTF (customs procedures and trade facilitation), SPS (sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures), STRACAP (standards, technical regulations and conformity 
assessment procedures), financial and telecommunication services, trade remedies, MNP 
(movement of natural persons), small and medium enterprises, government procurement, and 
dispute settlement.
16
 RCEP will be built on the consolidation of five ASEAN+1 FTAs, which 
is somewhat complicated because the commitments of ASEAN+1 FTAs are different. Like 
ASEAN+1 FTAs, RCEP will give special treatment to the least developed countries, and for 
this reason the schedule and depth of tariff elimination can differ by country, and 
differentiations can also be expected on a bilateral level.  
TPP includes deep and wide-ranging liberalisation. According to the US WTO-plus 
concept, TPP establishes new global rules and standards for world trade. It is also often said 
that TPP is a twenty-first-century agreement, meaning that it fits the needs of global value 
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chains of transnational companies which account for 60–80 per cent of global trade. TPP 
member countries have agreed not only on an elimination of 99–100 per cent17 of customs 
tariffs but also on an extensive elimination of non-tariff barriers.
18
 Although the schedules for 
phasing out or lowering tariffs differ by country (especially in agriculture) and most of its 
tariff schedules treat partners equally, some schedules, most notably those of the United States 
and Japan, retain differences among them.
19
 TPP consists of 30 chapters, covering, among 
other things, liberalisation of trade in goods and services, investments, competition policy, 
government procurement, labour market, intellectual property rights, environment, state-
owned companies, etc. TPP negotiations were concluded in Atlanta, USA, in October 2015 
and the agreement was signed in Auckland, New Zealand, in February 2016. The process of 
ratification began after the signing. Member countries have two years to ratify the agreement, 
which will come into force only after being ratified by six or more partner countries whose 
combined GDPs amount to more than 85 per cent of the total. Because of the high share of the 
USA and Japan, ratification by these two nations is essential. But holding true to his campaign 
promises, the new US president, Donald J. Trump, who took office on 20 January 2017, 
signed a presidential memorandum directing the US trade representative to withdraw the 
country as a signatory to TPP and from TPP negotiations. Ironically, on the same day Japan 
officially completed its domestic procedure for the ratification of TPP.
20
 But on the side-lines 
of a meeting of APEC countries in Hanoi on 21 May 2017 the trade ministers of the other 11 
TPP countries, led by Japan, agreed to try to resuscitate the free trade pact. Officials from the 
11 countries met again three times (in Japan in July and September, in Australia in August) to 
discuss their further efforts and bring proposals to the table before they could reach an almost 
final agreement at the APEC Summit in November 2017. And later, in January and March 
2018, they managed to conclude and ink the so-called Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which is a new trade agreement among the 
11 countries based on the original TPP Agreement with 22 provisions modified or suspended. 
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CPTPP is now in the ratification process. Regarding the ‘successor’ of TPP, it is still 
unclear if the 11 countries can lure the largest original TPP signatory, the USA, back to the 
negotiating table. The other uncertainty surrounding the mega-FTAs of the Asia-Pacific 
region is the slow progress of negotiations on RCEP. RCEP is still under negotiation,
21
 
although the conclusion of negotiations was planned by the end of 2015.  
In April 2017, Iman Pambagyo, who is the Chair of the RCEP Trade Negotiating 
Committee and ASEAN Coordinator for RCEP Negotiations, stated in his lecture at ISEAS in 
Singapore that only 10 per cent of the legal text of RCEP had been completed, and that only 
the drafts of the chapters on ECOTECH and competition had been ready by that time.
22
 One 
year later, Philippine Lead for RCEP Trade Negotiations Anna Robeniol
 said that ‘while not 
much information on the RCEP negotiations’ was available publicly, there were reports that a 
number of chapters had been completed. However, chapters on the larger issues of market 
access, investment, intellectual property rights, e-commerce and others were still ‘far from 
completion’.23 Negotiation on market access is the most challenging issue, especially among 
those big economies which have not concluded any FTAs so far (e.g. Japan–China, Japan–
South Korea, China–India). The conclusion of negotiations on RCEP can now be expected 
only by late 2018. 
Nowadays there are some uncertainties around mega-FTAs in the Asia-Pacific region, 
evidenced in the slow progress of RCEP and US participation in CPTPP. Regarding this issue, 
the next part of the study will investigate what kind of role and interests Japan has played in 
keeping mega-FTAs on track, but first considers how Japan’s trade policy has shifted towards 
mega-FTAs. 
 
Japan’s FTA policy 
Japan can be considered a latecomer in the field of FTAs. The country concluded its very first 
FTA with Singapore only in 2002, and exclusively supported the multilateral liberalisation in 
the framework of GATT/WTO until the end of the 1990s. After the Second World War, Japan 
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was the first East Asian country to set foot on the path of export-oriented industrialisation and 
rapidly became a global trading nation, interested in the development of a free and open 
global trading system to secure market access for its manufacturing products. Nevertheless, 
during the Cold War Japan proposed and/or started several formal or informal regional 
initiatives (e.g. PAFTA,
24
 PAFTAD, PBEC and PECC)
25
 in the Asia-Pacific region, but all of 
them were declaredly consistent with the global trading rules manifested in the GATT system 
and showed no intention to create a closed trading bloc discriminating against outsiders. At 
the end of the Cold War, the new wave of regionalism hallmarked by NAFTA and the 
European single market urged Japan (with Australia) to initiate APEC
26
 in 1989. With the 
creation of APEC, besides counteracting the discrimination of closed trading blocs, Japan 
wanted both to avoid the increase of US economic protectionism and bilateral trade frictions 
because of its (and other Asian developing countries`) huge trade surplus, and to rectify this 
imbalance. And third, because of the possibility of US military withdrawal from Asia at the 
end of the Cold War, the creation of APEC was also aimed at upholding and strengthening the 
USA’s stake in the Asia-Pacific. Like the former regional initiatives, the Japanese concept of 
APEC was characterised by non-exclusiveness, non-discrimination, openness and 
compatibility with GATT.
27
 The United States stood for a contrary concept and (with other 
free-trader nations) was pushing for legally binding commitments for trade and investment 
liberalisation, facilitation and cooperation. And in the second half of the 1990s, APEC 
became a backwater in regional trade negotiations, because of the confrontation (on the 
method of liberalisation) among member countries, especially between Japan and the USA. 
From the Japanese side there was strong resistance to the liberalisation of agriculture. 
The stalled development of cooperation in the framework of APEC and the lack of 
adequate help from the USA and the IMF to resolve the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 
caused Japan to turn from Asia-Pacific (APEC) to East Asian (ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6) 
cooperation. And the failure to start a new WTO round in 1997, and later the slow progress of 
multilateral trade negotiations, resulted in a shift in Japan`s trade policy from multilateralism 
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to bilateralism (EPAs
28
): bilateralism, because East Asian countries did not start any 
negotiations on a region-wide area until at least 2013. Instead of a region-wide FTA, 
ASEAN+1 FTAs were concluded and, in addition to these, East Asian economies concluded 
several other intra- and extra-regional bilateral FTAs. Between 2002 and 2015 Japan 
concluded 15 EPAs which are now in effect.
29
After decades of support for multilateral trade 
liberalisation, Japan started to slowly embrace the wave of the rapid spread of FTAs. But the 
15 EPAs cover only 22.3 per cent of Japan`s total trade.
30
 In addition to this, they do not 
contain full liberalisation of trade in goods. Japan has eliminated 86–87 per cent of customs 
tariffs in its EPAs but has failed to interconnect EPAs with long-awaited and needed domestic 
reforms and productivity enhancement (to support long-term economic growth). The EPAs 
have kept Japan`s agricultural sector and service industries largely protected and excluded. 
Japanese EPAs have been especially designed to facilitate the operation of Japanese 
companies in foreign markets, to further the foreign investments of Japanese companies and 
to secure access to the markets of partner countries who have little leverage in opening 
Japanese markets.
31
 Thus, it can also be stated that the development of Japan`s bilateral FTA 
policy has been primarily influenced by the strong agricultural lobby (agricultural 
cooperatives, ruling party politicians and farm bureaucrats) in keeping up protectionism, and 
by large companies, with their peak association Keidanren, which pushed for EPAs to respond 
to the prior FTAs of other countries deemed to put Japanese companies at a disadvantage in 
overseas markets.
32
 Finally on EPAs, Japan was motivated not only by economic but also by 
political reasons. Its contest with China for leadership in East Asian regionalism played an 
important role in the conclusion of EPAs with individual ASEAN countries and with ASEAN 
itself. Japan has not concluded any FTAs with China and South Korea. It started negotiations 
with South Korea in 2003, but South Korea withdrew from the discussions, afraid that an FTA 
would increase its trade deficit with Japan, and instead started FTA negotiations with its main 
export market, the USA. Japan and China did not initiate any negotiations on a bilateral FTA. 
But despite the lack of an FTA, Japan`s economic integration with China accelerated rapidly 
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and this was the most important driving force for Japan`s export-led economic growth 
between 2002 and 2007, before the global economic crisis. The missing link of an FTA 
among Northeast Asian countries explained the lack of a region-wide FTA. During the 
Koizumi era Japan’s deteriorating political relations with China and South Korea also 
contributed to this situation. 
The next shift in Japan`s trade policy happened in the post-global crisis era and was 
characterised by subdued global economic and trade growth and the poor results of the Doha 
round of WTO negotiations. In 2013, Japan started negotiations on RCEP (CJK FTA) and on 
EPA with the EU, and joined the TPP negotiations. In the case of Japan, mega-FTAs will 
significantly increase the trade coverage ratio of FTAs from 22.3 per cent to 70 per cent.
33
 So 
Japan has made the decision, bold in comparison to the earlier EPAs, to start FTA 
negotiations with its biggest trading partners. While Japan was unsuccessful in gaining 
multilateral trade preferences in the framework of GATT/WTO, as a second-best solution it is 
trying to accomplish this with mega-FTAs, on separate and parallel tracks. 
 
Japan’s role and its interests in keeping RCEP and TPP on track 
Japan’s general economic aim of participating in TPP and RCEP is to boost its exports, which 
led the country’s economic growth before the global financial and economic crisis, and to 
provide a more efficient functioning of Japanese companies investing abroad. In the case of 
former EPAs, Japan’s aim was the same. The difference is that mega-FTAs will extend 
unified procedures, requirements and rules (like ROOs) of former EPAs to a bigger market, 
covering more countries. And mega-FTAs also cover countries with sizeable domestic 
markets (USA, China) which have not previously concluded any EPAs with Japan. Japan’s 
participation in TPP has been highly motivated by the USA, which is Japan’s most important 
(consumption goods) export market and outward FDI destination country. In case of RCEP, 
China in particular represents a significant economic factor for Japan because China is its 
largest trading partner and second biggest export partner. The statistics of direct export from 
Japan or at the local sales of Japanese affiliates
34
 also make clear China’s growing role as a 
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consumption goods market. In addition, China is one of the few countries from the RCEP 
partner countries which has not concluded an EPA with Japan (as mentioned earlier), meaning 
there is no ongoing scheduled tariff elimination between them; only 8 per cent of China’s 
customs tariffs against Japanese products are zero now,
35
 making RCEP an important tool for 
Japan in increasing its market access to China. 
Japan’s economic growth strategy, the so-called Abenomics announced in 2012, has 
placed much emphasis on mega-FTAs, especially TPP, which can promote economic growth 
through export expansion. The extraordinary significance of TPP among FTAs for Japan was 
revealed by the creation of a TPP task force inside the Cabinet Office and the assignment of a 
state minister in charge of TPP (Mr Akira Amari). Japan’s liberalisation commitments in TPP 
have been the highest ever, in comparison to those of former EPAs.
36
 Since the whole TPP is 
a very ambitious FTA in terms of depth of liberalisation and scope of fields of commitments, 
it has become an important part of the ‘third arrow’ of Abenomics, which has linked TPP to 
long-awaited domestic structural reforms regarding agriculture, service industries and inward 
direct investments. The low productivity of agriculture and some service industries in 
comparison to the manufacturing sector is often cited as one of the reasons for Japan`s low 
economic growth. The opening up to international competition through liberalisation and 
deregulation of these sectors (especially the service sector, because agriculture represents only 
a tiny part of the whole GDP) could create higher economic growth. 
According to the CGE model estimations of Kawasaki,
37
 Japan may expect higher income 
gains from RCEP than from TPP. Yet when we compare the expected depth of liberalisation 
and scope of obligations of RCEP, which is still under negotiation, to the assumption of the 
model (regarding tariff removal and a decrease in non-tariff barriers), the estimates of Japan`s 
income gains from RCEP seem to be too optimistic. In terms of depth of liberalisation and 
scope of commitments, RCEP is expected to be less ambitious than TPP. As already 
mentioned, preferences in the framework of RCEP, which China will provide, can be 
significant for Japan, but the other important interest of the country related to RCEP, which 
JETRO and MOFA officials emphasise,
38
 is the unified ROOs for the whole of East Asia to 
provide more efficient functioning of the wide and complex regional production networks 
which Japanese companies have been building in the region since the mid-1980s. In addition 
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to this, the global economic crisis showed that East Asian countries should reduce their 
economic dependency on extra-regional final demand and rely more on the regional or 
domestic final demand. A region-wide FTA would provide a new final-demand market for 
East Asia through trade creation. Japan could rely more on the final demand of the growing 
middle class in neighbouring countries (not only in China). 
Beside the economic factors, we can also identify some of the political factors which 
motivated Japan to participate in RCEP and TPP. The pre-history of RCEP and the 
development of East Asian regionalism has been primarily characterised and formed by the 
contest between Japan and China for regional leadership. In 2005, Japan expanded East Asian 
cooperation to India, Australia and New Zealand to counterbalance China’s growing regional 
influence. The negotiations on RCEP with ASEAN+6 countries could thus begin in 2013 
when China became supportive mainly through Japan’s accession to TPP negotiations, which 
significantly increased TPP’s economic scale from the Asian side. 
In the last 15 years, Japanese–Chinese political relations have experienced several ups 
and downs. After the short interlude of the Hatoyama government, efforts to create a foreign 
policy of ‘independence from the USA’ and ‘growing closer to China’ in 200939 and the 
recurrence of conflicts in political relations with China from 2010, Japan assured the USA of 
its political support for the USA’s new Asia-Pacific strategy by announcing its intention of 
participating in TPP in 2010 and effectively joining the negotiations in 2013. In the 
framework of the new Asia-Pacific strategy, the USA launched a series of Strategic and 
Economic Dialogues with China in 2009, but in general the practice shows that the whole 
strategy rather interfered with China`s interests and was targeted to contain China`s rising 
power. The agreement on TPP was an important economic part of this strategy which was 
signed in February 2016. 
In Japan, the session of the Diet which decided on the ratification of TPP started at the 
end of September 2016, when uncertainty around the US ratification of TPP was already very 
high. Japan was the first country to ratify TPP, on 20 January 2017 when, ironically, the new 
US president, Donald J. Trump, announced the withdrawal of the USA from the TPP 
Agreement. After that, Japan – as the second largest economy among the TPP original 
signatories – undertook a leading role to keep TPP on track and put it into effect. The 
remaining 11 TPP countries were looking at whether and how much to revise the substance of 
the TPP Agreement. After several meetings, the trade officials of the TPP11 group were able 
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to reach broad agreement on the side-lines of the APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Da Nang, 
Vietnam, in November 2017. Only some issues remained unresolved, and these were 
successfully addressed in Tokyo in January 2018. The 11 countries inked the so-called 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in 
Santiago, Chile, in March 2018, a separate treaty that incorporates, by reference, the 
provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement with the exception of a limited set of 
provisions to be suspended.
40
 This is a list of 22 items (constituting only a small fraction of 
the overall agreement) that officials from the 11 member countries agreed to remove 
temporarily from the free trade agreement texts. In other words, these elements of TPP may 
come back into the agreement as originally negotiated.
41
 
The conclusion and the signing of CPTPP has not been left without any reaction from 
the United States. In January 2018, after one year of announcing the US withdrawal from 
TPP, US President Donald J. Trump stated in an interview at the World Economic Forum in 
Davos that he would reconsider the massive TPP trade deal if the United States could make a 
substantially better deal.
42
 And in April 2018, he told White House National Economic 
Council Director Larry Kudlow and US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer to look into 
joining the agreement of CPTPP signed in March which is now in the ratification process.
43
 
This signals that the United States may have a change of heart and wish to participate in the 
‘successor’ of TPP. It is predictable that Japan will continue to put significant effort into the 
successful realisation of mega-FTAs (CPTPP, Japan–EU EPA, RCEP) which could contribute 
to the country’s economic revitalisation. 
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 Conclusion 
It is Japan’s aim to boost its economic growth in the post-global crisis era. One of several 
tools is the trade policy in which there has been a sharp shift in comparison to the pre-crisis 
period characterised by bilateralism (bilateral FTAs) with smaller trading partners. This shift 
did not happen quickly, as there had been a long domestic debate (especially in the field of 
agriculture) even before Japan joined the TPP negotiations, but the move has caused a domino 
effect, the launch of other mega-FTAs. The withdrawal of the USA from TPP in early 2017 
has urged Japan, which has high economic expectations regarding mega-regional FTAs (see 
Abenomics), to take a leading role in the realisation of TPP and the fulfilling of its original 
aim. By inking CPTPP with the other 10 countries in March 2018, Japan has already taken a 
great leap forward on this path. Japan will continue to work on keeping TPP, through CPTPP, 
and other mega-FTAs on track and leaving the door open for a possible return of the USA to 
the ‘successor’ of TPP.  
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